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As a general rule, governmental entities in Indiana owe a duty to maintain existing signage, i.e., 
making sure the sign is upright and not obstructed by foliage. The sign must be visible to the motoring 
public for a sufficient distance to convey the applicable warning or regulatory information. Unresolved, 
to a great degree, is the degree to which government can be liable for failing to install warning or 
regulatory signs in the first instance. Litigation over such claims tends to focus upon application of two 
immunities within the Indiana Tort Claims Act, immunity for discretionary functions of government 
and immunity for having failed to adopt an ordinance. This paper contains a summary of existing law 
concerning application of these immunity provisions, as well as the immunity for the design of a public 
roadway, provided the roadway had not been substantially redesigned for a period of over 20 years. 
Also included herein is a discussion concerning the current state of the law on actual or constructive 
notice of defects. To prevail against a governmental entity on a signing claim, the plaintiff has to prove 
that the entity was on actual or constructive notice of the fact that the sign was down, obstructed by 
foliage, etc.
A) The Performance of a Discretionary Function (Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6)
No immunity provision has been more heavily litigated that discretionary function immunity. 
This is so, at least in part, because the statute does not define what a discretionary function is, and the 
courts have fashioned their own tests, modified over the years, in an effort to assess whether a 
particular challenged act or omission constitutes a discretionary function of government.
Discretionary function immunity traditionally has been applied in claims asserting negligence in 
road design or maintenance, sidewalk repair, signage, or in claims asserting the failure to undertake a 
particular public service or improvement. Immunity was once readily available as a shield against 
claims predicated upon the failure to sign or mark roadways, but the scope of the immunity in that area 
became restricted in its application with the issuance of the decision in Peavler v Board of 
Commissioners of Monroe County, supra.
Peavler changed the law, particularly in the context of road claims, by requiring governmental 
entities show policy-oriented decisionmaking in order to enjoy immunity. The supreme court in 
Peavler overruled a number of prior decisions which held, essentially, that certain challenged omissions 
were simply discretionary functions of government, as a matter of law, such as the failure to install 
regulatory signs on roadways. Under Peavler, on the other hand, the burden was shifted to the entity 
to show, by affirmative evidence, that it had engaged in planning or policymaking functions. In other 
words, the Peavler court reserved discretionary function immunity as a defense which "insulates only 
those significant policy and political decisions which cannot be assessed by customary tort standards." 
Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 45.
Thus, the failure to sign or mark a roadway will not invoke discretionary function immunity 
absent the entity's showing that it specifically decided not to sign or mark, where that decision involved 
policy considerations: "The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of 
proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks 
and benefits." Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 46.
In an effort to fashion a test for determining "whether the function is the type intended to 
benefit from immunity," the court described various factors which "point toward immunity," 528 
N.E.2d at 46:
1) The nature of the conduct -­
a) whether the conduct has a regulatory objective;
b) whether the conduct involved the balancing of factors without reliance on a 
readily ascertainable rule or standard;
c) whether the conduct requires judgment based on policy decisions;
d) whether the decision involved adopting general principles or only applying 
them;
e) whether the conduct involved establishment of plans, specifications and 
schedules; and
f) whether the decision involved assessing priorities, weighing of budgetary 
considerations or allocation of resources.
2) The effect on governmental operations -­
a) whether the decision affects the feasibility or practicability of a government
program; and
b) whether liability will affect the effective administration of the function in 
question.
3) The capacity of the courts to evaluate the propriety of the government's action -­
a) whether tort standards offer an insufficient evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim.
These various factors were adopted by the court as a means of evaluating discretionary function 
immunity under the new test adopted in Peavler the planning/operational test drawn from Federal Tort 
Claims Act litigation. Under the planning/operational test, courts are to distinguish between decisions 
involving formulation of policy, which are entitled to immunity, from decisions regarding only the 
execution or implementation of that policy, which are not entitled to immunity. Greathouse v 
Armstrong, 616 N.E.2d 364, 366-67 (Ind. 1993).
The Peavler court did not suggest how many of the factors require proof in order to warrant 
application of discretionary function immunity, but the essential conclusion is that a challenged decision 
is subject to immunity, if the decision resulted from a policy-oriented decisionmaking process. If 
entities engage in that process, the courts may not judge the wisdom of their decisions, as that 
judgment is left to the political process.
Typically, proof of policy-oriented decisionmaking involves issuance of board minutes, studies, 
surveys, or other evidence showing the policymaking authority of the entity considered a particular
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public improvement, even a minor one, and rejected it or put it on hold. The best application of the 
immunity, in a reported decision in recent years, is in City of Crown Point v Rutherford, 640 N.E.2d 
750 (Ind.App. 1994). In that case, a pedestrian slipped and fell on a city sidewalk. The city offered 
evidence that it financed the rehabilitation of its sidewalks from two funds, a HUD program and a 
50/50 program designed to operate as a gap filler to the HUD program. Under the 50/50 program, the 
Board of Public Works targeted a particular area for sidewalk rehabilitation and the board and residents 
split the cost of sidewalk repairs. While there was no evidence that the city engaged in planning or 
budgetary considerations concerning the area where the plaintiff fell, the court of appeals found the 
record was sufficient to apply discretionary function immunity, because the city had instituted a 
comprehensive scheme to renovate its sidewalks. There was testimony regarding a decision to target 
school zones, children's play areas and other high traffic zones such as the town square, all of which 
was a sufficient showing by the city of discretionary decisions, even though the specific sidewalk was 
not addressed at a policymaking level.
A contrary result is seen in Scott v City of Seymour, 659 N.E.2d 585 (Ind.App. 1995), where 
the plaintiff fell when her shoe became caught in a hole in the street. The city was in the middle of a 
downtown redevelopment project. The street had been cut to its base and the city intended to 
resurface it with asphalt, but only after other work on the project was complete. The intent was that 
once an asphalt overlay went down, the city would not have to cut into it again for other 
improvements, thereby conserving resources. Despite this record, the court of appeals held the city 
was not entitled to immunity, because there was no evidence the Board of Public Works engaged in a 
systematic decisionmaking process. The evidence instead consisted of conclusions from board 
members or the mayor concerning their overall thoughts behind not putting down the asphalt overlay, 
but no minutes or other evidence of official board action to delay the resurfacing. The Scott court 
distinguished City of Crown Point by noting that in Crown Point there was evidence of a board 
decision to utilize public monies to target certain areas.
In the highway context, the immunity was applied where the plaintiff contended the county was 
negligent in failing to extend a culvert pipe, widen traffic lanes, widen a shoulder and install guardrails. 
Voit v Allen County, 634 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.App. 1994). The county in Voit. was able to show that it 
had engaged in a systematic process for determining what improvements were to be made to highways 
in the county, and its urban transportation advisory board had concluded that traffic projections did not 
show a need to widen or improve the road in question. This was sufficient to entitle the county to 
immunity. See also State v Livengood, 688 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.App. 1997) (state immune for adopting 
highway standard for installation of guardrail end treatments); Lee v State, 682 N.E.2d 576 (Ind.App. 
1997) (state's improvement of dangerous curves in road in "planning" stage on date of accident; state 
immune).
On the other hand, in Hanson v Vigo County Board of Commissioners, 659 N.E.2d 1123 
(Ind.App. 1996), the court did not find discretionary function immunity in a case involving a plaintiff 
who was struck at an intersection while riding a bicycle. The intersection, out in the country, was not 
marked with stop or yield signs. Two years earlier a consulting engineering firm informed the county 
board of commissioners of the availability of federal funds to implement a program for the installation 
and replacement of road signs. The program was to ensure uniform signs at every intersection, and the 
board retained consulting engineers to design a plan for the placement and replacement of signs on 
roads in the county. The board approved the plan without deliberation and delivered it to the county
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engineer for implementation. Because the plan gave no priority to placement of signs at unmarked 
intersections over replacement of signs at marked intersections, and due to other factors, the court 
determined the county had made an insufficient showing of its entitlement to immunity. It was the 
county engineer and not the board of commissioners who decided how to implement the plan, so the 
court felt the board of commissioners, the county's policymakers, had not engaged in a systematic 
process for determining how to implement the sign plan. Compare Mullin v City of Mishawaka, 531 
N.E.2d 229 (Ind.App. 1988) (City engineer discussed recommendations of comprehensive plan with 
city council, council passed ordinance adopting plan for installation of warning signs at certain 
locations within the city; city deemed entitled to immunity for failure to put up warning sign at 
particular location).
Cases continue to come down from the court of appeals, and they continue to go both ways, 
predicated upon both the nature of the claim and the sufficiency of the record. Town of Highland v 
Zerkel, 659 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind.App. 1995) involved a pedestrian who sued the town due to a slip and 
fall on a sidewalk. The town's informal sidewalk replacement program was deemed insufficient to 
fulfill the Peavler requirements. The policy was simply "reactive," meaning the town would inspect and 
repair a sidewalk if someone complained about it.
In TXT Holdings v Tyner, 658 N.E.2d 111 (Ind.App. 1995), the plaintiff claimed there should 
have been some type of traffic control device at an intersection, but the city was able to produce an 
executive order from the mayor prioritizing new subdivisions so that those with greatest need for traffic 
control devices would be the first ones examined by the city engineer, who would then submit 
recommendations to the transportation board regarding installation of traffic control devices. This was 
deemed sufficient for discretionary function immunity.
Lee v State, 682 N.E.2d 576 (Ind.App. 1997), involved a July 1992 accident where the driver 
failed to negotiate a series of curves. The plaintiff alleged negligent construction and failure to warn. 
However, because INDOT's improvement of the curves was in the planning phase at the time of the 
accident and not its operational phase, the county was immune under Section 3(6). This was so even 
though the design and engineering aspects of the project were complete.
In Wade v Norfolk & Western Ry Co , 694 N.E.2d 298 (Ind.App. 1998), the plaintiff’s expert 
claimed the county was negligent in failing to realign or close a railroad crossing. the evidence showed 
the director of the county highway department established an annual budget for crossing 
improvements, and chose to pursue only those projects which were eligible for federal funding. The 
court held this was sufficient to invoke discretionary function immunity. See also Streiler v Norfolk & 
Western Ry Co , 642 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind.App. 1994) (county immune for not installing warning devices 
at unimproved crossing; State v Livengood by Livengood, 688 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.App. 1997) (state 
immune for using certain guardrail end treatments per standards adopted but replacement of guardrail 
end treatment does not invoke discretionary function immunity).
In PNC Bank v State, 750 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.App. 2001), the plaintiff was involved in an 
intersection collision. The traffic signal did not have a left turn arrow; the plaintiff alleged the county 
was negligent for not having a left turn arrow. The record showed INDOT's districts submitted 
proposed improvement projects; the original project for the intersection did not include left turn 
signals, though a later one did. Due to a variety of reasons, the improvement project was delayed. The 
court found the record sufficient to afford discretionary function immunity.
In summary, the availability of discretionary function immunity is necessarily dependent upon
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the practices of the insured. If the insured goes about considering public improvements in a systematic 
way, chances are a record will exist for application for discretionary function immunity, certainly more 
so than in cities, towns or counties operating under traditional informal practices. Also, the larger and 
more populated entities are more likely to have systems in place which can afford application of the 
immunity than will smaller cities, towns or rural counties. To the extent insureds can be encouraged to 
adopt practices, such as county-wide signage plans, or simply consideration of even minor public 
improvements before the policymaking authority, with accompanying recording of minutes, these type 
of efforts can go a long way toward availing these entities of discretionary function immunity in the 
event of a loss.
B) The Adoption and Enforcement of or Failure to Adopt or Enforce a Law, Unless 
the Act of Enforcement Constitutes False Arrest or False Imprisonment (Ind. 
Code § 34-13-3-3(7))
Immunity for enforcing or failing to enforce or adopt a law was severely restricted by the 
supreme court's 1993 decision in Quakenbush v Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993), but only in the 
context of immunity for law enforcement activities. The immunity still applies to claims which rest on 
the assertion that a governmental entity failed to undertake a legislative act, or in ordinance and code 
enforcement contexts. For example, governmental entities are immune from liability in claims which 
allege that an unsafe or dangerous speed limit was established on a certain road. Speed limits are 
established by legislative act of the governing body of the city, town or county. Cromer v City of 
Indianapolis, 540 N.E.2d 663 (Ind.App. 1989); Holiday Rambler Corporation v Gessinger 541 
N.E.2d 559 (Ind.App. 1989). In Joseph v La Porte County, 651 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind.App. 1995), the 
court found the decision to establish a speed limit at 45 miles per hour was subject to immunity under 
subsection 7. Similarly, governmental entities are immune from liability for failing to install (or change) 
regulatory signs which, under Ind. Code § 9-21, require enactment of ordinances. Bd Commissioners 
Harrison County v Lowe, app. no. 22C01-9908-CT-32) (slip op. 8/2/01).
In Quakenbush, the supreme court held the immunity did not apply in favor of a police officer 
who was allegedly negligent in the operation of a patrol vehicle. An entire body of case law was 
overruled both under Quakenbush and the 1991 supreme court decision in Tittle v Mahan, 582 N.E.2d 
796 (Ind. 1991). Without rehashing the entire history of law enforcement immunity, in a police 
context, and without commenting on the merits of Quakenbush or Tittle, it can be fairly said that 
immunity for police-related activities no longer exists. Quakenbush holds little more than if the police 
officer's conduct was lawful, then the immunity applies, but if lawful or non-negligent why does he 
need immunity to begin with? Instead, the clear intent of Quakenbush is to restrict application of this 
immunity to situations involving the decision of a governmental entity about whether to adopt or 
enforce a statute, rule or regulation. To that degree, the Quakenbush court reaffirmed certain previous 
decisions, including those involving a decision concerning legal action to end a strike by firefighters, 
Boyle v Anderson Firefighters Association, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.App. 1986); an administrative order 
from the Department of Natural Resources that a property owner stop construction of a dam, State v 
Taylor, 419 N.E.2d 819 (Ind.App. 1981); the issuance of a stop work order in order to enforce a 
zoning ordinance, City of Seymour v Onyx Paving Company, 541 N.E.2d 951 (Ind.App. 1989); a 
sanitation officer's enforcement of a local disposal ordinance, Board of Commissioners of Hendricks 
County v King, 481 N.E.2d 1327 (Ind.App. 1985). Each of these activities related to enforcement of
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or failure to enforce laws, rules or regulations by a governmental entity.
There is also some indication the old "law enforcement immunity" may be making a comeback, 
in apparent adherence to the Supreme Court's dictum in Benton v City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 
224 (Ind. 1999), that immunity analysis should focus on the language of the Tort Claims Act itself, 
rather than on "judicially created tests." City of Anderson v Davis, 743 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Ind.App. 
2001); Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 232. Thus, in Davis, the Court of Appeals applied law enforcement 
immunity to a claim involving the release of a police dog on a fleeing suspect. The Davis opinion 
asserts Benton "nullified much of Quakenbush," Davis, 743 N.E.2d at 363, by rejecting the distinction 
between "public" and "private" duties. Id. at 364. Because the officer in Davis was attempting to 
compel obedience to a law, the immunity applied, and the court rejected the argument that the 
immunity should not apply to intentional torts. Id. at 365. The court refused to apply the "excessive 
force exception" to law enforcement immunity under section 3(7) advanced by the Supreme Court in 
Kemezy v Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. 1993), noting that in light of Benton's abandonment of the 
Quakenbush test, "Kemezy cannot be regarded as good law to the extent it is based on the 
Quakenbush test." Davis, 743 N.E.2d at 365 n. 4.
Davis, in a footnote, even goes so far as to suggest that a police officer's use of excessive force 
or performance of duties in an otherwise illegal manner does not appear to defeat application of the 
immunity. Id-
In Minks v Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.App. 1999), police officers stopped a drunk driver and 
told his unlicensed minor passenger to do the driving; the officers did not arrest the drunk because the 
paperwork would take too much time. The court held the city immune for the officers' failure to 
enforce the law. See also City of Anderson v Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d 181 (Ind.App. 1999) 
(arresting officers immune on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where they executed 
arrest warrant, despite instructions from chief to not execute warrant); court in dicta noted willful and 
wanton behavior or even intentional criminal conduct may fall within the scope of a police officer's 
employment); O'Bannon v City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d (Ind.App. 2000) (police officers attempting 
to arrest armed felon did not use excessive force as a matter of law and were entitled to immunity 
under Section 3(7)).
The courts will also apply common law judicial immunity to police actions undertaken pursuant 
to court order. Mendenhall v City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218 (Ind.App. 1999) (padlocking 
property per court order); Grant County v Cotton, 677 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind.App. 1997) (detaining 
arrestee until validity of warrant could be ascertained subject to judicial immunity).
City of Anderson v Davis, of course, is only a decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme 
Court has yet to address the proper application of Section 3(7) to law enforcement related claims in 
light of abandonment of the public/private duty test. Nor has there been a law enforcement immunity 
decision, since Benton, which addresses application of the immunity in the auto-related context.
It's possible, if transfer is accepted in Davis, that the Supreme Court will come full circle and 
apply law enforcement immunity broadly, to virtually any law enforcement related activity, as originally 
held by the Supreme Court in Seymour National Bank v State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1981), clarified 
on rehearing, 428 N.E.2d 203. But such a result isn't likely. After all, it was the 1990s court's inability 
to accept the result in Seymour National Bank (100 mile per hour police chase, collision with innocent 
third party) which initiated the successive waves of "judicially created tests," fashioned to minimize the 
harsh effect of applying the immunity to all facets of police negligence. Look for the Supreme Court to
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uphold holdings like that in Davis to arrest situations or pursuit of felons, but to somehow circumvent 
application of the immunity to auto claims.
C) Design of a Highway if the Loss Occurs at Least Twenty (20) Years After the 
Highway Was Designed or Substantially Redesigned (Tnd. Code § 34-13-3-3 (17))
This immunity, which was added to the list of immunities in the late 1980s, was intended to 
serve as something of a statute of repose in claims involving negligent design of highways.
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Section 17 affords immunity for the design of a highway, if the loss occurs at least 20 years 
after the highway was designed or substantially redesigned. The immunity has been held to apply to 
the original design of a highway, including its right-of-way and existing improvements, e.g., the width 
of a shoulder, the absence of guardrails, etc. Immunity has also been held, however, to have no 
application where the plaintiff rests on a theory of failing to update, improve or modernize a roadway, 
i.e., failing to adopt a "new design." Voit v Allen County, 634 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.App. 1994). The Voit. 
court's construction of the immunity restricts its application, as design claims often turn on the 
allegation that the governmental entity should have modernized or updated the overall design of a road. 
The immunity continues to be recognized where the claim rests on deficiencies in the original design. 
Shand Mining, Tnc v Clay County Board of Commissioners, 671 N.E.2d 477 (Ind.App. 1996); State 
v Livengood by Livengood, 688 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.App. 1997) (state immune under design immunity 
for continued utilization of guardrail installed in 1960s).
If the highway undergoes "substantial redesign" within 20 years of the date of loss, the 
immunity may not apply. State v Livengood, supra.
In Jacobs v Board of Commissioners of Morgan County, 652 N.E.2d 94 (Ind.App. 1995), the 
court held the immunity did not apply to the absence of a warning sign at a curve on a roadway, even 
though the road had never been signed and the county engineer attested, by way of affidavit, that 
signage is part of design. The court conceded the county was immune from liability for the original 
design and configuration of the road, but that "design" under section 17 does not encompass warning 
signs. Thus, the plaintiff can't complain about the curvy nature of a roadway, but can complain about 
the fact that warning signs were not installed to advise him of the approach of the curves. See also 
Harkness v Hall, 684 N.E.2d 1156 (Ind.App. 1997) (design immunity not applicable to claim of 
defective signage).
D) Actual or Constructive Notice
To impose liability on a municipality for injuries suffered due to a dangerous or defective 
condition on municipal property, a claimant must prove the dangerous or defective condition existed, 
and that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of it, as well as a reasonable 
opportunity to repair the defect, prior to the accident. Butler v City of Indianapolis, 653 N.E.2d 501, 
transfer granted, 668 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 1996). Notice to a municipality of the existence of a defect 
may be of two kinds, actual or constructive. Actual notice is simply knowledge of a part of a 
municipality, acquired either by personal observation or through communication from a third person, of 
the existence of the defective condition. Notice to the municipal employee is imputed to the 
municipality, via agency principles. The general rule requires receipt of notice by a municipal officer or 
employee who had a duty to report the defect to proper municipal authorities. McQuillan on 
Municipal Corporations, Section 54.107 (1994). For example, notice of a defect in a street or sidewalk 
provided to a street commissioner or a city councilman constitutes notice to the city. City of 
Hammond v Jahnke, 178 Ind. 177, 99 N.E. 39 (1912); City of Columbus v Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 
25 N.E. 65 (1890). Notice to members of a fire department of defects in the foundation of a sidewalk 
is not notice to the city, however. City of Indianapolis v Ray, 52 Ind.App. 388, 97 N.E. 795 (1912).
Once the entity has notice of a dangerous condition, it has a "reasonable time" to remedy the 
problem. Howard v Trevino, 613 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ind.App. 1993). Determination of what is a 
"reasonable time" is not susceptible to precise definition, and typically involves a question of fact for 
the jury. There are reported decisions outside Indiana which hold that the period of time between
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discovery and accident may be so brief as to preclude a jury determination, but the Indiana Court of 
Appeals has held that a three hour delay between the city's notice of a missing stop sign and the time of 
accident was a sufficient lapse of time to present a jury question on whether the city was able to 
remedy the defect in a reasonable time. Howard v Trevino, supra, (state department received notice of 
missing stop sign at 9:15 a.m., work order for replacement of sign prepared at 12:22 p.m., sign 
replaced at 1:15 p.m. Accident occurred around noon. City argued no jury issue was presented 
because the lapse of time was insufficient, in light of difficulties presented by the number of miles of 
city streets, available employees, etc.).
While there is no Indiana case on point, other jurisdictions hold that notice to police officers is 
ordinarily not notice to the municipality, except where the officer is charged with the duty of reporting 
defects. McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, Section 54.106.10 (1994).
Most premises claims do not turn on proof of actual notice, because constructive notice is 
sufficient. The rule of constructive notice of a defect applies to defects which might have been 
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. Gilson v City of Anderson, 141 Ind.App. 
180, 226 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1967). Knowledge is imputed to the entity if the defect existed for a 
sufficient period of time that the entity should have known of its existence, by the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence:
In cases like this one before us, it is well settled in this state that the complaining party 
must not only prove that the alleged defective condition existed, but that the city had 
knowledge thereof, actual or constructive, long enough before the accident to repair 
the defect, and failed to do so. The rule of constructive knowledge applies only to such 
defects as might have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence.
Board of Commissioners of Delaware County v Briggs, 337 N.E.2d 852, 868 (Ind.App. 1975).
Thus, to fulfill proof requirements for constructive notice, the plaintiff must come forward with 
some evidence showing the defect existed for a long enough time such that notice may fairly be 
imputed to the entity. Failing that, judgment in favor of the entity is appropriate.
For example, in Bodnar v City of Gary, 629 N.E.2d 278 (Ind.App. 1994), the plaintiff alleged 
she was unable to see a stop light because it was obscured by trees. She ran the red light, collided with 
another vehicle, and then sued the city, alleging negligence in failing to trim the tree which obscured the 
stop light. The court of appeals concluded Bodnar had failed to offer any evidence to support actual or 
constructive notice to the city, and therefore affirmed entry of judgment in favor of the city:
. . . Bodnar needed to demonstrate that the city had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the visibility problem in this case. She has, however, put forth no evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that the city had the requisite knowledge. See Id., at 
1013. We will not assume a breach of duty in this case in the absence of evidence from 
which a proper inference of knowledge can be drawn.
Bodnar, 629 N.E.2d at 280.
Failing to offer some evidence as to how long a sign was down, or how long a hole existed, 
will defeat a plaintiff's claim on the basis of having failed to offer evidence on an element of plaintiff's
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cause of action. A plaintiff cannot rest on the mere assertion that a sign, for example, may have been 
down for days or even hours; it also may have been down for only five minutes. An evidentiary 
inference cannot be based on speculation or even probability. Pardue v Seven-Up Bottling Company, 
407 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ind.App. 1980).
The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff invited just such "inferential speculation" in Butler 
v City of Indianapolis, 653 N.E.2d 501 (Ind.App. 1995), affirming summary judgment for the city on 
grounds that plaintiff failed to raise a factual dispute regarding whether the city had actual or 
constructive notice of the presence of a hole, but the supreme court vacated the summary judgment 
and remanded, 668 N.E.2d 1227, holding a fact issue existed as to whether the city had notice.
In Butler, a minor stepped into a hole which resulted from removal of a temporary no parking 
sign. The sign had been installed for the Indianapolis 500, and removed after the race. The city offered 
proof that a city employee removed the sign and filled the hole with sand on 5/26/92. Plaintiff 
responded to the city's motion with affidavits from neighbors who merely stated that it was typical for 
the city not to fill holes left by the temporary parking signs. The supreme court found this evidence 
sufficient to raise a jury issue on whether the hole was in fact filled on 5/26/92; if it was not, the city 
then had actual knowledge of its existence, since its own employee removed the sign.
Butler is interesting because the court acknowledges plaintiff could offer no direct evidence as 
to the hole in question, but the broad statement that the city never filled any of the holes, in a general 
area, was deemed sufficient to create a jury issue concerning whether the hole was in fact filled.
The facts in Butler depart from the typical fall down scenario, which involve an unfilled (or 
never filled) hole; under the more typical facts, plaintiffs must still offer evidence as to how long the 
particular hole had been around. There is no reason to read Butler to hold that evidence concerning 
the length of time that "nearby" holes existed is sufficient to get to a jury.
Sometimes circumstantial evidence is available to prove constructive notice. For example, in 
Spier by Spier v City of Plymouth, 593 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind.App. 1992), a minor plaintiff was injured 
when a city sign post broke and fell on his hand. The sign post had rusted through near its base, the 
point at which it broke. The extent of the rust suggested that the rust had been building up for a long 
time. One of the neighbors had landscaped and mulched the right-of-way on which the sign post was 
located, but the rusted area of the sign post was immediately above the level of the mulch. The city 
was aware sign posts tended to rust and had a program of inspection and maintenance. The court 
found this evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue on constructive notice, as a material issue of 
fact existed as to whether the rusted out condition existed for a sufficient period of time for the city to 
be charged with constructive knowledge of its existence.
Other circumstances come to mind. For example, assume a sign is found lying in the weeds, 
but no local resident can recall it ever being down. If the plaintiff can offer no evidence as to how long 
the sign was down, there has been a failure of proof on the constructive notice element of the cause of 
action, and summary judgment in favor of the entity is appropriate. Plaintiff must resort to attempting 
to find some circumstantial evidence, e.g., if the sign was found lying in the weeds, is the grass under 
the sign dead or matted? Was the sign covered with snow? Is there other physical evidence which 
could suggest the sign had been lying on the ground for a period of time, and not on the post?
Sometimes expert opinion even comes into play, in close cases. For example, assume a sign is 
down only one hour and the governmental entity offers an expert's opinion that 1) the entity cannot be 
expected to discover fallen signs, as a general rule, with any greater frequency than every 24 hours, or
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2) even if the entity was placed on actual notice of the fallen sign, a reasonable response time, in order 
to install a new sign, is two hours. Is this opinion evidence enough to warrant summary judgment on 
breach of duty absent any countervailing opinion evidence from plaintiff?
Another example: assume a sign is obscured by leaves. The accident occurs in May. Is it 
necessary to hire a horticultural expert to prove leaves grow in May, such that the sign must have been 
obscured for at least a few weeks during the month of May? Or can the jury infer that on its own? 
Bodnar v City of Gary, supra, which involved an overhanging tree limb, suggests it may be unwise to 
presuppose that certain facts, in and of themselves, constitute evidence supporting constructive notice.
Finally, notice can be in issue even in claims not involving streets or sidewalks. In Czaja. v City 
of Butler, 604 N.E.2d 9 (Ind.App. 1992), homeowners were injured by a fallen tree. The only 
evidence they could muster was that limbs and branches occasionally fell from the tree, and that the 
adjacent sidewalk had buckled due to tree roots. There was no outward evidence that the tree was 
rotten. Summary judgment in favor of the city was therefore affirmed.
12
